

Original Research Article

Effects of Price insurance programs on supply response: a case study of corn farmers in Quebec

ABSTRACT (ARIAL, BOLD, 11 FONT, LEFT ALIGNED, CAPS)

ABSTRACT:

Aims: *This study examines the supply response of corn in the province of Quebec.*

Study design: *A time series design is implemented.*

Place and Duration of Study: *Our analysis covers the period from 1985 to 2013 and uses the data of corn production in the province of Quebec.*

Methodology: *A generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) process is used to model output price expectations and its volatility.*

Results: *We found that application of the Farm Income Stabilization Insurance in Quebec neutralizes the adverse effects of price volatilities on corn production and generates a market power for corn producers. The change in the producers' attitude towards risk is other implication of the insurance program.*

Conclusion: *These results imply that implementation of the insurance program in the province of Quebec leads to an increase of corn production and consequently this increase in production can impose more compensation cost (paid by the insurance program) to governments.*

Keywords: price volatility, GARCH, corn supply response, effective price, market price

1. INTRODUCTION

Many types of risks affect agricultural activities; they include the risk of production (including climate risk, production yield risk, and disease), the risk associated with a possible change in government policies, the risk associated with fluctuations in the exchange rate, price risk and the risk of competition in international markets (Antón, Kimura and Martini, 2011). These risks increase uncertainty for agricultural producers and affect their behavior because they make it more difficult to estimate income, cost, and agricultural profit. The effects of these fluctuations on producers' well-being justify the implementation of risk management strategies, intended to reduce the adverse effects of risks through identifying potential risks and planning risk-handling activities.

33 Several studies show that price risk is perceived as an important source of risk in many
34 countries (Antón and Kimura (2011); Palinskas and Székely (2008); Hall et al. (2003); Patric
35 et al. (1985)). Agricultural prices are very volatile and do not follow a particular trend (Rezitis
36 and Stavropoulos, 2010; Rodríguez et al, 2010; European Commission, 2001). Given the lag
37 between the production decision and marketing, farmers make decisions based on their
38 expectations about prices. Therefore, price volatility leads to income fluctuations and affects
39 farmers' welfare. Several empirical studies have focused on analyzing the effect of price
40 volatility on farmers' production decisions.¹

41 Behrmann (1968) analysed the effects of variability of prices and yields on supply response
42 of four major annual crops - rice, cassava, corn and kenaf in Thailand during the period of
43 1937-1963. He has examined the Nerlovian dynamic total supply response model
44 incorporating the standard deviation of the price and yield in the last three periods, as risk
45 factors, in this model. However, this was criticized for the fact that the Nerlovian price
46 expectation model is not consistent with changing variance of the subjective probability
47 distributions.

48 Ryan (1977) introduced a simple linear model in which price risk variables were initially
49 constructed from the variance and covariance of pinto bean and sugar beet prices during the
50 three preceding years. The fixed weight lag scheme proposed by Fisher is used to weight
51 these variance terms.

52 Traille (1978) analyzed the US onion supply response to price risk. He has modeled the
53 price risk using the difference between expected price and actual price. In this study,
54 expected price is assumed to be a function of past observations on price.

55 Seale and Shonkwiler (1987) have developed sub-regional supply and production models for
56 U.S. watermelons. These authors modeled price expectation and price risk using rational
57 expectation and the difference between expected and actual price respectively.

58 Holt and Aradhyula (1990), Holt (1993), Rezits and Stavropoulos (2008) and Rezits and
59 Stavropoulos (2010) have modeled price volatilities using a GARCH model. In these studies,
60 Holt (1993) used a rational price expectation model while the others suppose that prices
61 follow an autoregressive form. Mbagala and Coyle (2003) used the Autoregressive Distributed
62 Lag model (ADL) to analyze the reaction of beef production to price risk. They modeled price
63 expectations and price volatility by the naive expectations model and squared errors of
64 prediction respectively.

65 However, these studies assume that price volatility is a source of risk that reduces
66 production, but this variable cannot be presented as a measure of risk in all conditions.
67 Implementation of price insurance programs is an example of situations in which the price
68 risk would not significantly affect the production decision. Price insurance is a risk
69 management tool, which allows producers to protect themselves against unexpected output
70 price declines beyond market expectations. Consequently, application of these programs
71 would result in non-significant effect of price volatility on production and provide an incentive
72 to increase production. In this study, we will show that implication of a price insurance
73 program, as a risk-handling tool, neutralizes adverse effects of price volatility on agricultural
74 production.

¹ Dalal and Alghalith (2009) and Bobtcheff and Villeneuvey (2010) theoretically analyzed the impact of two sources of uncertainty, namely uncertainty on output price and on input price. For these authors, increasing the price risks (inputs and outputs) should reduce production.

75 This study focuses on price risk because of the high volatility of agricultural input and output
76 prices (Huchet-Bourdon, 2012; FAO, 2011). The objective of our study is to explore the
77 supply response of corn in the province of Quebec taking into consideration the presence of
78 a price insurance program (ASRA) in this province and thus providing useful information to
79 policy makers about the implications of Program ASRA.

80 Corn cultivation is the third most important in the world after wheat and rice and remains one
81 of the most important crops in Canada, particularly in the east (Lichtfouse and Goyal, 2015).
82 Field corn is also Canada's third most important grain crop after wheat and barley
83 (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada).² The province of Quebec produces 33% of the corn
84 representing the second corn producer of Canada (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 2006).
85 ^{3,4} In Quebec's agricultural sector, an important consideration is the existence of the Farm
86 Income Stabilization Insurance Program (Assurance Stabilisation du Revenu Agricole,
87 ASRA).⁵ Under this program, the government compensates producers when the market
88 price is less than the production cost. Consequently, ASRA reduces losses associated with
89 price risk. Because of this insurance program, the market price is different from the price
90 received by Quebec producers (effective price)⁶. This program may thus change supply
91 response to prices. Consequently, we estimate two empirical models: one including corn
92 supply response versus market prices⁷ and other including corn supply response versus
93 effective prices⁸.

94 First, in this study we analyze the behavior of corn producers in Quebec towards risk in
95 absence of the price insurance program. Then we analyze if implication of ASRA as an
96 insurance program can manage the price risk and increase the welfare of producers. In other
97 words, we analyse if under the insurance program the production decision is still sensitive to
98 risk factors. Given that the insurance program is intended to protect Quebec producers
99 against unexpected output price declines below production cost, we expect this program
100 neutralizes the negative effects of price volatility on producer's well-being. In addition, it
101 would be of interest to study the implications of the insurance program on the sensitivity of
102 production function to different risk factors. Furthermore, given that insurance program
103 reduces losses associated with price risk, it is consistent to study if the implementation of
104 this program affects the risk aversion of producers.

² <http://www.agr.gc.ca/fra/?id=1299248319435>

³ <http://www.agr.gc.ca/eng/industry-markets-and-trade/statistics-and-market-information/by-product-sector/crops/crops-market-information-canadian-industry/market-outlook-report/corn-situation-and-outlook-june-2009/?id=1378841170965>

⁴ Between the years 2009-2012, 76% of Quebec corn production was destined to animal feed (Statistics Canada and FPCCQ). See at <http://www.grainwiz.com/industry/quebecmarket>

⁵ The sectors supported by ASRA, which reached their peak in 2002, comprise: fattened calves, steers, grain-fed calves, piglets, pigs, lambs, oats, wheat, corn, potatoes, milk calves, canola, barley, soybeans and apples.

⁶ Although over estimation period, program Regime d'assurance du revenu brut (RARB) is also applied in the province of Quebec, but this program is not directly linked to producer prices. For this reason we supposed that this program is not directly linked to production decision. However ASRA directly affects the price received by producer.

⁷ The model including market prices represents absence of ASRA.

⁸ Specification of the model including effective prices includes the premium paid to producers under program ASRA, Programme canadien de stabilisation du revenu agricole (PCSR, 2003-2006) and program agri-stability (since 2007).

105 In this study, we assume that prices follow an autoregressive process, and an asymmetric
 106 generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (Asymmetric GARCH) process is
 107 adapted to model the price volatility. This technique is appropriate when modeling
 108 agricultural price volatilities because it allows unconditional variance to vary over time.
 109 Furthermore, modelling price volatilities by the Asymmetric GARCH model, allows us to
 110 investigate the possible asymmetric effects of price shocks. The possible existence of
 111 asymmetry of corn price volatility can provide useful information about market structure.

112 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the econometric
 113 model of corn production and data. Then the empirical results are explained, and the final
 114 section presents the implications and conclusions of the study.

115 116 2. METHODOLOGY

117 118 2.1. Supply response function

119 Following Rude and Surry (2014), we assume that producers have a constant absolute risk
 120 aversion, and that the price distribution is normal. Under these conditions, the objective
 121 function of the producer is written as follows:
 122

$$1. \text{MAX}_S P^e S - C(S) - \frac{\lambda}{2} S^2 h^e$$

123 Where P^e is price expectations, h^e is price variance, S is corn production, λ is the absolute
 124 risk aversion parameter, S^2 is square value of production and $C(S)$ is the cost function. Profit
 125 maximization by the producer allows us to derive the following production function:

$$2. S_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 PC^e_t + \gamma_2 PF^e_t + \gamma_3 h^e_{Ct} + \gamma_4 h^e_{Pt} + \gamma_5 \sum_{i=1}^d S_{t-i} + \gamma_6 T_t + \varepsilon_{1t}$$

126 Where PC^e_t is the expected price of corn (as output), PF^e_t the expected price of fertilizer⁹
 127 (as input), h^e_{Ct} the volatility of corn prices, h^e_{Pt} the fertilizer price volatility and ε_{1t} the error
 128 term. We assume that, in the long term, production adjusts to its desired level (Nerlove,
 129 1956) and we incorporate lagged dependent variables ($\sum_{i=1}^d S_{t-i}$) in the model.¹⁰ To capture
 130 the effect of technological progress, we incorporate a trend variable (T_t).
 131

⁹ Seeds and fertilizer are two principal inputs in the production of corn. The autocorrelation between the residuals of the seed price equation led us to remove this input from the model.

¹⁰ Production lags imposed on the model are determined by the VARSOC method. This method reports the final prediction error (FPE), Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) lag order selection statistics for a series of vector autoregressions of order 1 to maximum lag. A sequence of likelihood-ratio test statistics for all the full variables of order less than or equal to the highest lag order is also reported. However, our tests suggest one lag in the model.

132 **2.2. Price expectation**

133

134 Following Reztis and Stavropoulos (2010), we assume that prices follow the autoregressive
135 process (AR):

$$3. P_t = \beta(L)P_t + \varepsilon_{2t}$$

136

$$\varepsilon_{2t} | \Omega_{t-1} \sim N(0, h_t)$$

137

138 where $\beta(L)$ is a polynomial lag operator, P_t is current price, ε_{2t} is an error term, Ω_{t-1} is the
139 information set of all past states available in period t-1 and h_t is the conditional variance of
140 ε_t .

141 The Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) was used to determine the appropriate order of corn
142 market and effective price equations while using the general to specific method of selecting
143 the appropriate order of the fertilizer price equation.¹¹ Consequently, price equations are as
144 follows:

$$4. PC_t = a_0 + \sum_{i=1}^L b_i PC_{t-i} + c_1 G_t + c_2 T_t + \varepsilon_{3t}$$

145 With:

146 L=3 If our model includes market prices.

147 L=1 If our model includes effective prices.

$$5. PF_t = b_0^F + b_1^F PF_{t-1} + b_2^F PF_{t-2} + b_3^F PF_{t-3} + c_1^F G_t + c_2^F T_t + \varepsilon_{4t}$$

148 Where PC_t and PF_t represent corn price and fertilizer price respectively. The dummy variable
149 (G_t) is introduced to capture the effect of structural changes. These structural changes
150 generated by the oil price increase after 2006, engender the rise in agricultural prices.
151 (Baumeister and Kilian, 2014). The study of Avalos (2014) confirms the changes in dynamic
152 of corn price after 2006, which is related to oil price variation. T_t captures the effect of a trend
153 on prices.

154

155 **2.3. Variance modeling**

156 Unlike the other time series models, generalized autoregressive conditional
157 heteroskedasticity models (GARCH) allow the conditional variance to vary over time, which
158 is very relevant given the dynamics of agricultural prices. This characteristic of these models
159 led us to use GARCH models to model price volatilities.

¹¹ Using BIC to determine the order of the fertilizer price equation has caused autocorrelation between the residual of the input price equation.

160 An asymmetric GARCH model is used to investigate the possible asymmetric effects of price
 161 shocks. In this model, the past values of the error terms ($\sum_{i=1}^q \gamma_i \varepsilon_{2,t-i}$) are added to the
 162 price variance equation. These terms allow positive and negative shocks to have different
 163 effects on volatility. In this model the volatility is defined as:

$$6. \quad \text{VAR}(\varepsilon_t | \mathcal{E}_{t-1}) = h_t^2 = \omega_0 + \sum_{i=1}^q \alpha_i \varepsilon_{2,t-i}^2 + \sum_{i=1}^p \theta_i h_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{i=1}^q \gamma_i \varepsilon_{2,t-i}$$

164 According to equation 6, the conditional variance (h_t^2) is defined as a linear function of q
 165 lagged squared residuals and p lagged past conditional variances. The following restrictions
 166 are imposed to ensure that the conditional variance is strictly positive:

$$\alpha_0 \geq 0, \alpha_i \geq 0 \text{ and } \theta_i \geq 0$$

167 The stationarity of variance is guaranteed by $\sum_i \alpha_i + \sum_i \theta_i < 1$ (Bollerslev, 1986). Further, if
 168 the prices do not show the ARCH effect, we use simple moving variance to incorporate price
 169 volatility in the model.

170 The residual test of price equations reveals the presence of serial auto-correlations in the
 171 squared residuals of the market and effective price of corn. This is one of the implications of
 172 the ARCH effect in the model, which led us to run the Lagrange Multiplier test to ensure the
 173 presence of heteroskedasticity in these equations. The results of this test, applied to
 174 equation 4 indicate that the hypothesis of no ARCH effect can be rejected at the 5% level of
 175 significance (Table A1 and Table A2). Consequently, we have modeled the volatility of the
 176 market and effective price of corn by a GARCH model. The order of the GARCH model is
 177 determined by a visual examination of the correlogram of the squared residual of the price
 178 equation and the results of the Ljung-Box (1976) Q test (Bollerslev, 1988).¹² Then, to model
 179 corn price volatility, equation 6 can be written as follows:
 180

$$7. \quad h_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \varepsilon_{2,t-1}^2 + \theta_1 h_{ct-1}^2$$

181 Where h_{ct} is the volatility of the corn price.

182 Further, the residual test of the fertilizer price equation and the Lagrange Multiplier test
 183 (Table A3) confirm the lack of ARCH effect in the fertilizer price equation. For this reason, we
 184 have incorporated simple moving variance of fertilizer price in the model.

186 2.4. Estimation approach

187
 188 Variables PC^e_t, PF^e_t, h^e_{ct} and h^e_{ft} generated by the GARCH model can be used to
 189 estimate equation 2. Pagan (1984) concluded that using variables generated by stochastic
 190 models to estimate a structural equation could cause biased estimates of the parameters'
 191 standard deviations. One of the methods used to avoid this problem is the Full Information
 192 Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. This method simultaneously estimates the supply
 193 response function, the price equation and the GARCH process parameters. Considering

¹² Visual examination of the correlogram of the squared residual of the price equation and the results of the Ljung-Box Q test (1976) propose ARCH(1) model for modeling market price and effective price variance.

194 system of equations 8 (the model of market prices) and 9 (the model of effective prices), the
 195 joint distribution of ε_{1t} , ε_{2t} and ε_{3t} is written as follows:

$$8. \begin{cases} S_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 PC_t^e + \gamma_{21} PF_t^e + \gamma_3 h_{Gt}^e + \gamma_{41} h_{Tt}^e + \gamma_5 \sum_{i=1}^p S_{t-i} + \gamma_6 T_t + \varepsilon_{1t} \\ PC_t = b_0 + \sum_{i=1}^q b_i PC_{t-i} + \alpha_1 G_t + \alpha_2 T_t + \varepsilon_{2t} \\ PF_t = b'_0 + b'_1 PF_{t-1} + b'_2 PF_{t-2} + b'_3 PF_{t-3} + \alpha'_1 G_t + \alpha'_2 T_t + \varepsilon_{3t} \end{cases}$$

196

$$9. \begin{cases} S_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 PC_t^e + \gamma_{21} PF_t^e + \gamma_3 h_{Gt}^e + \gamma_{41} h_{Tt}^e + \gamma_5 \sum_{i=1}^p S_{t-i} + \gamma_6 T_t + \varepsilon_{1t} \\ PC_t = b_0 + b_1 PC_{t-1} + \alpha_1 G_t + \alpha_2 T_t + \varepsilon_{2t} \\ PF_t = b'_0 + b'_1 PF_{t-1} + b'_2 PF_{t-2} + b'_3 PF_{t-3} + \alpha'_1 G_t + \alpha'_2 T_t + \varepsilon_{3t} \end{cases}$$

$$10. \varepsilon_t = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{1t} \\ \varepsilon_{2t} \\ \varepsilon_{3t} \end{bmatrix} \sim N \left[\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{11} & \sigma_{12} & \sigma_{13} \\ \sigma_{12} & h_{Gt} & \sigma_{23} \\ \sigma_{13} & \sigma_{23} & h_{Tt} \end{bmatrix} \right]$$

197 Where $\begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{11} & \sigma_{12} & \sigma_{13} \\ \sigma_{12} & h_{Gt} & \sigma_{23} \\ \sigma_{13} & \sigma_{23} & h_{Tt} \end{bmatrix} = \Pi_t$ represents the variance-covariance matrix. The log-likelihood
 198 function of the above system is given as follows:

$$11. l_T(\theta) = 0.5 \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(\theta)$$

$$12. l_t(\theta) = -\log |\Pi_t| - \varepsilon_t' \Pi_t^{-1} \varepsilon_t$$

199 **2.5. Data**
 200

201 Our analysis covers the period of 1985 to 2013, and the supply response model is based on
 202 annual data. Data on seeded area of corn (corn production) are obtained from Statistics
 203 Canada,¹³ and are expressed in Hectares.
 204 Corn market prices¹⁴ and are obtained from Statistics Canada.¹⁵ The effective prices are
 205 built by adding compensation under the Farm Income Stabilization Insurance program, Agri-
 206 Stability program and Canadian Farm Income Stabilization program (PCRA) to market prices
 207 (these programs are complementary). Compensation values are from the *La Financière*
 208 *agricole* (provincial government agency) website.¹⁶
 209 Fertilizer prices are from Statistics Canada¹⁷. Following Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010), all
 210 prices are deflated by the consumer price index¹⁸ (2002 = 100). Table 1 presents some
 211 statistics of the data used in the analyses.
 212
 213
 214
 215
 216
 217
 218

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard-deviation
PC (Corn market price explained by dollars per ton)	1.7	0.99	3.03	0.41
PF (fertilizer price explained by dollars per ton)	0.38	0.23	0.77	0.14
S (Corn supply explained by hectare)	340 350	225 000	449 000	68 336.9
PCEF(Corn effective price explained by	2.15	1.35	3.91	0.5

¹³ Table 001-0010

¹⁴ Commodity prices are collected at point of first transaction, where fees deducted before a producer is paid are excluded (for example, storage, transportation and administration costs), but any bonuses and premiums that can be attributed to specific commodities are included. Commodity-specific program payments are not included in the price.

¹⁵ Table 002-0043

¹⁶

http://www.fadq.qc.ca/statistiques_et_taux/statistiques/assurance_stabilisation/historique_par_produit_dassurance.html

¹⁷ The Farm Input Price Index (FIPI) measures the change through time in the prices received for agricultural commodities at the first transaction point. Much of the price information used in compiling the index is obtained from a monthly survey of farm respondents throughout Canada, tables 3280001 and 3280015.

¹⁸ Price deflation by the industrial products price index (IPPI), as estimated by Rude and Surry (2014), generates the autocorrelation in the squared residuals of GARCH.

dollars per ton)

219
220
221
222
223
224
225

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 2 provides the results of unit root tests. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) tests were conducted. The VARSOC method was used to determine the optimal lag of variables.

Table 2. Results of unit roots tests

	Model without intercept and without trend		Model with intercept and without trend		Model with intercept and trend	
	augemented Dickney Fuller (ADF)	Philips - Perron (PP)	augemented Dickney Fuller (ADF)	Philips - Perron (PP)	augemented Dickney Fuller (ADF)	Philips - Perron (PP)
PC (3 lags)	-1.418	-1.181	-4.036 ^c	-3.715 ^c	-3.992 ^c	-3.680 ^a
PF (2 lags)	-0.560	-0.44	-0.616	-0.993	-2.106	-2.373
S (1 lag)	1.1	-1.534	-1.529	1.143	-1.428	-1.651
PCEF (1 lag) (4 lag)	-0.807	-0.738	-4.191 ^c	-3.765 ^c	-4.601 ^c	-4.097 ^c

226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

Corn seeded area and fertilizer price variables are non-stationary, while the results regarding corn market and effective price are mixed. This justifies the incorporation of trend variable in price equations as well as in production equation.

3.1. Price analysis

Tables 3 and 4 present the results of output and input price equations used to construct output and input price expectations. The equations of predictions are used as structural model equations.

The estimation results of the output price equations are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Results of corn price equation

Parameter	Variable	Coefficient	Coefficient
		(Model including market prices)	(Model including effective prices)
		Conditional mean	
b ₀	1	0.29(0.000)	0.43 (0.000)
b ₁	PC _{t-1}	1.37 (0.000)	0.85 (0.000)
b ₂	PC _{t-2}	-0.58(0.000)	-
b ₃	PC _{t-3}	0.10(0.000)	-

c_1	G_t	0.06(0.000)	0.003(0.90)
c_2	T_t	-0.0009(0.000)	0.0009 (0.001)
Conditional Variance			
α_0	1	0.005 (0.000)	0.02 (0.000)
α_1	$\varepsilon_{2(t-1)}^2$	0.94 (0.000)	0.30 (0.000)
θ_1	$\varepsilon_{2(t-1)}$	0.06 (0.000)	0.12 (0.000)

Test of market price equation's residual generated by the autoregressive (AR) model (ε_{2t})

Q(6)	6.5 (0.37)	5.57 (0.47)
Q(12)	12.19 (0.43)	15.860 (0.20)
Q(18)	13.58 (0.76)	20.14 (0.32)
Q(24)	15.17 (0.91)	31.13 (0.15)
Q^2 (6)	32.93 (0.000)	8.94 (0.18)
Q^2 (12)	77.41 (0.000)	30.64 (0.002)
Q^2 (18)	81.16 (0.000)	37.90 (0.004)
Q^2 (24)	82.43 (0.000)	48.82 (0.002)

Test of market price equation's residual generated by the SAARCH model ($\varepsilon_{2t} \cdot h_t^{-0.5}$)

Q(6)	8.66(0.19)	6.00 (0.42)
Q(12)	11.28(0.51)	12.17 (0.43)
Q(18)	12.87(0.80)	15.20 (0.65)
Q(24)	19.5 (0.72)	28.65 (0.23)
Q^2 (6)	1.03(0.98)	3.24 (0.77)
Q^2 (12)	18.39(0.11)	21.20 (0.26)
Q^2 (18)	19.78 (0.34)	13.92 (0.73)
Q^2 (24)	25.90 (0.35)	31.42 (0.14)

P-values are in parentheses

238 According to the results, the coefficients of autoregressive terms of the price (b_1 , b_2 and b_3)
239 are significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the conditional variance expressed by α_1 is
240 significant, which indicates time-varying volatility. Furthermore the coefficients of conditional
241 variance of market price and effective price sum less than unity ($\sum_{i=1}^2 \alpha_i + \beta_1 = 0.94$ and
242 0.30 respectively), implying persistent volatility.
243 The coefficient of asymmetry factor of shocks (θ_1) is significant at 1%, which confirms the
244 presence of an asymmetric effect of shocks on volatility. The positive sign of θ_1 indicates
245 that a positive shock in price causes more volatility than a negative shock of the same
246 magnitude. This can be justified by strong position of corn producers in Quebec market, in
247 the way that they can benefit unexpected positive shifts in demand by increasing the price
248 but in the case of unexpected negative shifts they are not force to cut their prices (Rezitis
249 and Stavropoulos, 2010). This is consistent with the structure of the Quebec corn industry
250 which is characterized by small numbers of big producers¹⁹. This market power can also be
251 justified by implementation of the insurance program which compensates the negative

¹⁹ In the province of Quebec 6160 corn farms devoted 402,441 Hectares of land in 2011(Statistic Canada, table 004-0003).

252 shocks of price and consequently leads to less volatility in the case of negative shocks than
 253 positive shocks.

254 Finally the Ljung-Box Q statistic test was applied to the residuals (ϵ_{3t}) and the squared
 255 residuals (ϵ_{3t}^2) of corn price equations to analyze the performance of the model. The results
 256 of this test on ϵ_{3t} and ϵ_{3t}^2 support the non-rejection of the hypothesis that the residuals of
 257 the output price equations are white noise, and the hypothesis for the absence of the ARCH
 258 effect is rejected. These results are one of the implications of the GARCH model presented
 259 by equations 4 and 7 (Bollerslev 1987). The application of an appropriate order of GARCH
 260 removes the correlation of squared residuals (Giannopoulos, (1995)). The Ljung-Box test
 261 applied to residuals and squared residuals of the SAARCH model indicates the absence of
 262 correlation between the residuals and squared residuals.

263
 264
 265
 266
 267
 268
 269
 270

Table 4 presents the estimated parameters of fertilizer price (equation 5).

Table 4. Results of fertilizer price equation		
Parameter	Variable	Coefficient
Mean		
b''_0	1	0.05(0.01)
b''_1	PF _{t-1}	0.88 (0.000)
b''_2	PF _{t-8}	-0.49(0.000)
b''_3	PF _{t-9}	0.42(0.000)
c''_1	G _t	0.04(0.013)
c''_2	T _t	0.0002(0.25)
Residual test of fertilizer price equation (ϵ_{3t})		
Q(6)		2.95 (0.81)
Q(12)		9.81 (0.63)
Q(18)		10.68 (0.91)
Q(24)		13.55 (0.95)
Q ² (6)		1.22 (0.98)
Q ² (12)		6.56 (0.88)
Q ² (18)		7.94 (0.98)
Q ² (24)		8.22 (0.99)

P-values are in parentheses

271
 272
 273
 274
 275
 276
 277

According to the results of Table 4, the coefficients of autoregressive terms of fertilizer (b''_1 , b''_2 and b''_3) are significant at the 1% level.

The Ljung-Box Q statistic test, applied to the residuals (ϵ_{3t}) and the squared residuals (ϵ_{3t}^2) of the fertilizer price equation, affirms the absence of correlation between the residuals and the squared residuals of the input price equation.

278 **3.2. Supply response**

279

280 A Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the equations of structural model. The
 281 estimation of coefficient of determination (R^2) confirms the good specification of the model
 282 (table 5). Finally, the Ljung-Box Q statistic test, applied to the squared residuals of supply
 283 response equations attests absence of ARCH effect in the model (table 5). The same result
 284 is found for the residuals.²⁰

285 Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the structural model constructed by output
 286 price expectation, input price expectations, output price volatility and supply response
 287 equation.

288

289

290

Table 5. Results of corn supply response

Parameter	Variable	Coefficient (Model including market prices)	Coefficient (Model including effective prices)
γ_0	1	-17800000 (0.000)	-18800000 (0.001)
γ_1	PC_t^e	88128.6 (0.05)	85171.38 (0.10)
γ_{21}	PF_t^e	-49029.8 (0.005)	-29913.13 (0.10)
γ_3	h_{ct}^e	-1267520 (0.08)	-995104.9 (0.38)
γ_{41}	h_{Ft}^e	-3283563 (0.008)	-3064009 (0.11)
γ_5	SU_{t-1}	0.55 (0.001)	0.45 (0.009)
γ_6	T_t	8953.5 (0.002)	9477.14 (0.001)
Residual test of supply equation (ϵ_{1t})			
Q(3)		2.42 (0.48)	4.84 (0.18)
Q(6)		2.65 (0.85)	6.07(0.41)
Q(9)		3.60 (0.93)	7.71 (0.56)
Q(12)		4.10 (0.98)	9.33 (0.67)
Q2 (3)		0.27 (0.96)	1.78 (0.62)

²⁰ The autocorrelation between the residuals of the model was examined by several tests, namely Ljung-Box (Table 5), Harvey, and Guilkey (Table A4 and A5). There is concordance between the results of these tests regarding the absence of residual autocorrelation of the model.

Q ² (6)	0.28 (0.99)	2.85 (0.83)
Q ² (9)	0.30 (1.00)	5.13 (0.82)
Q ² 12)	0.37 (1.00)	8.16 (0.77)
	Adjusted	Adjusted
	R ² =0.67	R ² =0.88

P-values are in parentheses


291

292 The coefficient of the expected price of corn (γ_1) has a positive sign, as expected. However,
 293 the coefficient of the expected price of fertilizer (γ_{21}) is negative, implying a decrease in corn
 294 production following an increase in the input price, which is also expected. The negative sign
 295 of the coefficients of corn price volatility and fertilizer price volatility (respectively γ_3 and γ_{41})
 296 implies that production responds negatively to an increase in volatility. These results are
 297 consistent with prior studies (such as Holt and Aradhyula (1990), Holt (1993), Rezits and
 298 Stavropoulos (2008), Rezits and Stavropoulos (2010), and Rude and Surry (2014)). The
 299 coefficient γ_5 shows the adjustment speed to desired output. The coefficient γ_6 captures the
 300 effects of the corn production trend.

301 The results illustrate the significant effect of risk factors (expected output and input price, as
 302 well as variance of input and output price) on corn production in the absence of insurance
 303 program. However, variance of output and input price can not affect corn production when
 304 insurance program is implemented. It is not surprising since insurance program is intended
 305 to stabilize the producers' income in Quebec. In other words, this program prevents
 306 producers' income fluctuations following price volatility and thus this insurance program
 307 engenders corn production (as a product covered by the insurance program) not to be
 308 affected by price volatilities. Consequently we can conclude that implementation of
 309 insurance program in the province of Quebec was successful to neutralize the adverse
 310 effects of price volatilities on corn production. Furthermore a comparison between the supply
 311 response of the model including market prices and the model including effective prices
 312 provides important information for policy makers. As illustrated in figure 1 implementation of
 313 insurance program increases corn production thus we can conclude that the premium paid to
 314 corn producers has a positive effect on corn production in the province of Quebec.

315 Implementation of insurance program in the province of Quebec leads to an increase in corn
 316 production through motivating actual producers as well as potential producers. The premium
 317 paid to corn producers, by neutralizing the negative effects of price volatility, motivates
 318 producers to increase their production. On the other hand this premium helps small
 319 producers to manage the risk and to be able to compete in the market.

320



321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347

Estimation of corn supply elasticity²¹ relative to expectations of corn effective price (0.523 in short term and 0.952 in long term), to expectations of fertilizers price (-0.124 in short term and -0.275 in long term), to corn price volatility (-0.069 in short term and -0.126 in long term) and to fertilizer price volatility (-0.037 in short term and -0.082 in long term) confirm the Le Chatelier principle (Samuelson, 1947).²² These estimations imply that the corn supply response is more sensitive to output prices and input price than to volatilities²³. This can be justified by application of insurance program, which neutralizes the effects of price fluctuations on the supply of corn.

These estimates also imply that corn supply response is more sensitive to the expected price of output than to the expected price of inputs. Several reasons may explain this result. First, the gap between the production decision and purchase of inputs is shorter than that between production decisions and marketing (Nijs, 2014). Further, input prices are positively correlated to the price of outputs. In other words, the increase in input prices causes a rise in output prices. Therefore, production is less affected by input price variations than by that of output price.

Estimation of supply elasticities in the model including market prices (supply elasticities are 0.43, -0.2, -0.08 and -0.04 in short term and 0.958, -0.45, -0.19 and -0.088 in long term relative to expected output price, expected input price, output price volatility and input price volatility respectively) reveals that implementation of the insurance program decreases the sensitivity of corn supply response relative to risk factors in long term.

Furthermore, our estimation of supply response elasticity relative to corn market price is consistent with that obtained by Haile, Brockhaus and Kalkuhl²⁴ In United states.²⁵

3.3 Relative marginal risk premium index

²¹ We used estimated parameters of the model and the simple average of variables to estimate elasticity.

²² The Le Chatelier principle implies that long-term elasticities of supply and demand are more important than short-term elasticities.

²³ Price volatilities are not significant.

²⁴ Unfortunately, we did not find other studies estimating corn supply elasticities in Canada.

²⁵ Agricultural prices in Canada and United-States are integrated.

348 Finally, we analyzed the behavior of corn producers in Quebec towards risk by calculating
 349 the Relative marginal Risk Premium (RRP). This index is determined by the negative of the
 350 ratio of the variance and price elasticity of supply (Holt and Moschini, 1992):

$$13. \quad RRP_t = -\gamma_{ab} \cdot \frac{\sigma_p^2}{\epsilon_p^2}$$

351 Where $\gamma_{ab} = \left(\frac{\gamma_{a1}}{\gamma_{a1}}, -\frac{\gamma_{b1}}{\gamma_{b1}} \right)$

352 $\gamma_{a1}^e = \gamma_{a1}^e$ if $\gamma_{ab} = \frac{\gamma_{a1}}{\gamma_{a1}}$

353 $\gamma_{b1}^e = \gamma_{b1}^e$ if $\gamma_{ab} = -\frac{\gamma_{b1}}{\gamma_{b1}}$

354

355 The positive and significantly different from zero²⁶ value of input and output mean RRP
 356 (indicated in Table 6) in the models including market prices implies risk-averse behavior of
 357 corn producers rather than risk-neutral behavior in the absence of the insurance program
 358 (Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2010). However, non-significant coefficients of output and input
 359 price volatilities in the model including effective prices imply risk neutral behavior of corn
 360 producer in the presence of insurance program. In other words, implementation of the
 361 insurance program, through managing and neutralizing the risks associated to negative
 362 shocks of price, changes the behavior of corn producers towards price risk. This behavior
 363 change from risk aversity to risk neutrality of corn producers affects corn supply and thus
 364 well-being of producers.

365

366

367

Table 6. Estimation of Relative marginal Risk Premium index (RRP) of Quebec corn producers

	Mean RRP in the model including the market price	Mean RRP in the model including the effective price
Output	0.2	0
Input	0.2	0

368

369

370

4. CONCLUSION

371 The impact of price fluctuations on the supply response of agricultural products has been
 372 considered one of the major issues in the literature. Many theoretical and empirical studies
 373 have analyzed the effects of price risk on the supply response of different agricultural
 374 products. They mainly defined price fluctuation as a source of risk that can reduce
 375 production. However, implementation of price insurance programs, as risk management
 376 tools, helps producers to insure themselves against unexpected negative shocks of price.
 377 Consequently, application of these programs would result in non-significant effect of price
 378 volatility on the supply response and provide an incentive to increase production.

²⁶ Coefficient of all risk factors are significant.

379 This paper investigates the supply response of corn in the province Quebec where a price
380 insurance has been implemented. Given that the insurance program could affects the
381 agricultural supply response to prices, we studied the supply response of corn to market
382 prices, along with the effective prices defined as market prices plus compensation of the
383 insurance program. An asymmetric GARCH procedure is used to model output price
384 expectations and its volatility. However, the absence of the ARCH effect in input prices led
385 us to model input price volatility by a simple moving variance. The model parameters were
386 estimated by the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method.

387 We have shown that application of the insurance program in Quebec affects the supply
388 response of corn to risk factors and neutralizes the adverse effects of price volatilities on
389 corn supply response. In other words, despite the emphasis of the literature on the
390 importance of price volatilities on the supply of agricultural products, the results of our study
391 show that output and input price volatilities are not the major factors of risk for corn producer
392 in Quebec. These results are justified by application of the insurance program which
393 stabilizes corn price and prevents production decision to be sensitive to price volatilities.
394 Although, the output and input price expectation are still significant risk factors in Quebec
395 corn production, the results show that implication of the insurance program decreases the
396 sensitivity of corn supply to these factors of risk.

397 We have analyzed the structure of corn market in the province of Quebec. The results imply
398 market power of corn producers in Quebec in a way that that they can benefit of the positive
399 shocks in demand but they are not forced to reduce the prices in the case of negative
400 demand shocks. This market power can be justified by the structure of the Quebec corn
401 industry as well as by implementation of the insurance program.

402 We have also estimated supply elasticity relative to output and input price expectations, as
403 well as to price volatilities. These estimations demonstrate that corn producers in Quebec
404 perceive output price expectations as the most important risk factor. Further, results show
405 lower sensitivity of supply to input prices than to output prices. This is justified by correlation
406 between output and input prices as well as less important delay between production decision
407 and input purchase than between production decision and marketing. Another important
408 finding is that the corn supply elasticity estimate relative to output price expectation is of a
409 similar order of magnitude to that of prior studies.

410 Finally, we have analysed the implications of the insurance program in Quebec corn
411 production. We concluded that compensations of this program make producers not perceive
412 input and output price volatilities as risk factors when their output is guaranteed under the
413 insurance program while price volatilities are significant risk factors in absence of ASRA.

414 On the other hand, application of the insurance program in Quebec changes the attitude of
415 corn producers from risk averse to risk neutral. This behavior change, , through motivating
416 actual producers and potential producers, increases corn production and consequently this
417 increase in production can impose more compensation cost (paid by the insurance program)
418 to governments.

419

420

421

422 REFERENCES

423

- 424 1. Antón, J., S. Kimura and R. Martini. 2011. Risk management in agriculture in Canada.
425 OECD Publishing (40).

- 426 2. Avalos, F. 2014. Do oil prices drive food prices? The tale of a structural break. *Journal of*
427 *International Money and Finance* 42 :253-271.
- 428 3. Ayinde, O.E., Bessler, D.A. and Oni, F.E. 2014. Analysis Of Supply Response And Price
429 Risk On Rice Production In Nigeria. In 2014 Annual Meeting, July 2014: 27-29,
430 Minneapolis, Minnesota (170347). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- 431 4. Baumeister, C. and L. Kilian. (2014). Do oil price increases cause higher food prices?.
432 *Economic Policy* 29(80):691-747.
- 433 5. Behrman, J. R. 1968. Supply response in underdeveloped agriculture; a case study of
434 four major annual crops in Thailand, 1937-1963.
- 435 6. Bobtcheff, C., and S. Villeneuve. 2010. Technology Choice under Several Uncertainty
436 Sources. *European Journal of Operational Research* 206: 586-600.
- 437 7. Bollerslev, T. 1986. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. *Journal*
438 *of Econometrics* 31(3): 307-327.
- 439 8. Bollerslev, T. 1987. A conditionally heteroskedastic time series model for speculative
440 prices and rates of return. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 69(3): pp 542-547.
- 441 9. Bollerslev, T. 1988. On the correlation structure for the generalized autoregressive
442 conditional heteroskedastic process. *Journal of Time Series Analysis* 9(2): 121-131.
- 443 10. Dalal, A.J. and M. Alghalith. 2009. Production decisions under joint price and production
444 uncertainty, *European Journal of Operational Research* 197(1): 84-92.
- 445 11. EC-European Commission. 2001. Risk Management Tools for EU Agriculture—with a
446 special focus on insurance. Directorate A. Economic Analyses, forward studies.
- 447 12. FAO. 2011. L'état de l'insécurité alimentaire dans le monde : Comment la volatilité des
448 cours internationaux porte-t-elle atteinte à l'économie et à la sécurité alimentaire des
449 pays? Rome, Italie.
- 450 13. Giannopoulos, K. 1995. Estimating the time varying components of international stock
451 markets' risk. *The European Journal of Finance* 1(2): 129-164.
- 452 14. Haile, M. G., Brockhaus, J. and Kalkuhl, M. 2016. Short-term acreage forecasting and
453 supply elasticities for staple food commodities in major producer countries. *Agricultural*
454 *and Food Economics*, 4(1) : 17.
- 455 15. Haile, M.G., Kalkuhl, M. and von Braun, J. 2013. Agricultural supply response to
456 international food prices and price volatility: a crosscountry panel analysis. In 2013
457 Annual Meeting, August 2013 : 4-6
- 458 16. Hall, D. C., Knight, T. O., Coble, K. H., Baquet, A. E., & Patrick, G. F. (2003). Analysis of
459 beef producers' risk management perceptions and desire for further risk management
460 education. *Review of Agricultural Economics*, 25(2), 430-448.
- 461 17. Holt, M. T. 1993. Risk response in the beef marketing channel: A multivariate
462 generalized ARCH-M approach. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 75(3): 559-
463 571.
- 464 18. Holt, M. T. and G. Moschini. 1992. Alternative measures of risk in commodity models: An
465 analysis of sow farrowing decisions in the United States. *Journal of Agricultural and*
466 *Resource Economics* 17(1):1-12.
- 467 19. Holt, M. T. and S. V. Aradhyula. 1990. Price Risk in Supply Equations: An Application of
468 GARCH Time-Series Models to the US Broiler Market. *Southern Economic Journal*
469 57(1):230-242
- 470 20. Howatt, S. 2006. Corp profile for field corn in Canada. Agriculture and Agri-food Canada
471 publications A118-10/13-2006E-PDF
- 472 21. Huchet-Bourdon, M. 2012. Est-ce que la volatilité des prix des matières premières
473 agricoles augmente? Une étude historique. Éditions OCDE.
- 474 22. Lichtfouse, E and A. Goyal. 2015. Sustainable Agriculture Reviews: Cereal Sustainable
475 Agriculture Reviews. 16: 34-35

- 476 23. Mbagha, M. and B. T. Coyle. 2003. Beef supply response under uncertainty: An
 477 autoregressive distributed lag model. *Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*
 478 28(3):519-539.
- 479 24. Nerlove, M. 1956. Estimates of the elasticities of supply of selected agricultural
 480 commodities. *Journal of Farm Economics* 38(2):496-509.
- 481 25. Nijs, L. 2014. *The Handbook of Global Agricultural Markets: The Business and Finance*
 482 *of Land, Water, and Soft Commodities*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- 483 26. Pagan, A. 1984. Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated
 484 regressors. *International Economic Review* 25(1) 221-247.
- 485 27. Palinkas, P. and Szekely, C. (2008). Farmers' risk perception and risk management
 486 practices in international comparison. *Bull. of the Szent István Univ., Gödöllő*.
- 487 28. Patrick, G. R., Wilson, P. N., Barry, P. J., Boggess, W. G., & Young, D. L. (1985). Risk
 488 perceptions and management responses: producer-generated hypotheses for risk
 489 modeling. *Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 17(2), 231-238.
- 490 29. Rezitis, A. and K. Stavropoulos, 2008. Supply Response and Price Volatility in the Greek
 491 Pork Industry. *International Conference of Applied Economics*.
- 492 30. Rezitis, A. N. and K. S. Stavropoulos. 2010. Modeling beef supply response and price
 493 volatility under CAP reforms: the case of Greece. *Food policy* 35(2): 163-174.
- 494 31. Rodríguez, A., Rodrigues M. and Salcedo. S. 2010. The outlook for agriculture and
 495 rural development in the Americas: a perspective on Latin America and the Caribbean.
 496 *Boletín CEPAL/FAO/IICA*.
- 497 32. Rude, J. and Y. Surry, 2014. Canadian Hog Supply Response: A Provincial Level
 498 Analysis. *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne*
 499 *d'agroeconomie* 62(2): 149-169.
- 500 33. Ryan, T. J. 1977. Supply response to risk: The case of US pinto beans. *Western Journal*
 501 *of Agricultural Economics* 2:35-43.
- 502 34. Samuelson, P. A. 1947. *Foundations of economic analysis*. Harvard University Press
- 503 35. Traill, B. 1978. Risk variables in econometric supply response models. *Journal of*
 504 *Agricultural Economics*, 29(1):53-62.

505
 506
 507
 508

APPENDIX

Table A1. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for corn market prices (AR(3))

Chi2	Degrees of freedom	Prob>chi2
40.59	1	0.000
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect disturbance		Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p)

509

Table A2. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for corn effective prices (AR(3))

Chi2	Degrees of freedom	Prob>chi2
20.782	10	0.02
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect disturbance		Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p)

510

Table A3. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for fertilizer price		
Chi2	Degrees of freedom	Prob>chi2
3.813	8	0.87
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect disturbance		Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p)

511

512

Table A4. Harvey and Guilkey autocorrelation test applied to corn supply function versus market price			
Single Equation Autocorrelation Tests			
	Harvey LM test	Rho	Pvalue>chi2
Supply equation	0.005	0.0003	0.94
Corn market price equation	0.10	0.0057	0.74
Corn volatility equation	0.74	0.0392	0.39
Fertilizer price equation	0.64	0.0338	0.42
Fertilizer volatility equation	2.4	0.1266	0.12
Rho: Correlation coefficient			
Null hypothesis: No Autocorrelation			

513

514

Table A5. Harvey and Guilkey autocorrelation test applied to corn supply function versus effective price			
Single Equation Autocorrelation Tests			
	Harvey LM test	Rho	Pvalue>chi2
Supply equation	0.93	0.05	0.33
Corn volatility equation	0.66	0.03	0.41
Fertilizer price equation	2.62	0.13	0.11
Fertilizer volatility equation	2.66	0.13	0.11
Rho: Correlation coefficient			
Null hypothesis: No Autocorrelation			

515

516

517

518