

Public Policy Making in Coalition Government: Challenges and Solution**ABSTRACT**

One of the most interesting scenarios of the political scenes in several countries in the current years is the emergence of the coalition government. The governance by an amalgam of various political parties is based on negotiations among them and a striking balance between conflicting interests and ideas. The paper aims to study, explore and skim through the literature available about the processes of public policy-making in a coalition government. The methodology of the study is based on a systematic review of Government coalitions and challenges faced in policymaking. A total of 50 studies have been searched considering the literature on a coalition government, Solutions to identified issue, delegation and agent issues and challenging ministerial discretion. Out of them, ten studies have been extensively reviewed, three on modelling of the coalition government, four Challenging ministerial discretion and three on delegation and agent issue. The study arrives at two factors which guide decision making. First is the individual preferences of the agents or the ministers of the cabinet and second being the party ideologies and functioning. The party ideals were found to be more important because it meant weight regarding electoral costs. Existing research has focused more on the formation and termination of coalition arrangements rather than on the policy output by the government so formed. The difference that exists between the different configurations of the multi-party governments has a significant impact on public policy making. The study concludes that the country with divergent and coalition government is recommended to formulate an agreement at the very start to reduce the future impact of divergent preference of political parties in policy formulation. Along with it, the presence of ideological differences on important issues like liberalisation, secularism, expectations of instability leads to the rise of minority coalitions which lead to difficulties in planning and implementation of policies.

Keywords: Coalition government, delegation, agents, challenges, identified solution, and political party

1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent years, there has been an increase in the number of coalition governments in the parliament(Hazlehurst, 2001). Owing to this, in parliamentary democracies, the coalition's transform the public policy making on the party platforms into uncertainty because of inter-party differences in ideologies and functioning. A coalition government is a form of government which includes several party who cooperate to arrive at unanimous decision regarding different policies. It becomes imperative to understand the challenges and address the issue by suggesting corresponding solutions to the issue of public policy making by these coalition governments. In the face of clear and potential divergent interests and preferences of

41 participating parties in the coalition governments, it raises questions about the manner in
42 which the multi-party governments arrive at unequivocal decisions regarding policy agenda.
43 This form of government is generally weak because there is no majority party. This results in
44 underhanded deals and increased corruption, as more political parties engage in deals in
45 order to get things accomplished.

46 When there is absence of clean majority during general elections, parties either form coalition
47 cabinets under parliament majority or end up with minority cabinets which has one or more
48 parties. Cabinets supported by parliament are more stable and efficient whereas minority
49 cabinets are prone to internal struggles.

50 Most of the literature and data available pertains to the formation, allocation of portfolios
51 within the multi-party government, and the termination of such governments. Thus, the
52 present study has been conducted to draw inferences from theories on coalition and
53 concerned parties as to how public policy making impacts them. The study aims to allow a
54 conceptual starting point and to bring the research on public policy making in the coalition
55 governments. The paper intends to identify the challenges and solution underlying in the
56 formation of public policy in the coalition government.

57 **2. METHODOLOGY**

58 The researcher has adopted systematic review as a methodology to study the challenges and
59 solutions of public policy making in Coalition Government. This review systematically
60 searches, identifies, selects, appraises, and synthesizes research evidence relevant to the
61 question using a methodology that is explicit, reproducible, and leads to minimal bias. It helps
62 to present clear findings to highlight problems, challenges, and offer proof about the effect of
63 the implementation of policies and keep into account the findings of similar studies.

64 **2.1 Search Strategy**

65 Challenges faced by the coalition government in policy-making were searched to do a
66 literature review for the present systematic review. The studies that were investigated
67 involved the concept of policymaking in a coalition government and different challenges. To
68 perform a literature search, the following set of single and combined words were used:
69 *coalition government, influencer, policy making, challenges, political parties, delegation,*
70 *agency issue and modelling.*

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72 **2.1.1 Description of Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

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74 **2.1.1.1 *Inclusion criteria***

75 The below-mentioned set of inclusion criteria that have been adopted to select the studies for
76 review in the research:

- 77 • Discussion about challenges faced in coalition government while making policy.
- 78 • Study based on the Coalition government.
- 79 • Studies reported the possible solutions to the policy-making in the coalition
80 Government.

81 **2.1.1.2 *Exclusion criteria***

82 The various exclusion criteria used to reduce inclusion of non-pertinent information sources
83 were:

- 84 • Studies that discuss soul and basic concepts of Coalition government, with no
85 Challenge and solution to the problem.
- 86 • Studies in a language other than the English
- 87 • Studies that were not accessible completely

88 **2.2 Selection of studies- Process of systematic review**

89 Before discussing, inferring the impact of the coalition government on the public policy
90 making, there is a requirement of making a selection of studies. After reviewing 50 studies on
91 this significant function of the coalition government, there were 15 studies that carried
92 forward a discussion about policymaking. On further investigation of 10 studies, three were
93 specifically about the modelling of the coalition government, and three were concerning
94 delegation and agency issues. Moreover, four studies were about challenging ministerial
95 discretion. Modelling of coalition government has helped in representing the exact structure
96 and composition of the coalition government in the present study. Delegation and agency
97 issues has addressed the delegation of the powers, authorities and the responsibilities among
98 different parties. The issues of delegation have been prominent in coalition government.
99 Another important factor that was considered while reviewing literature was challenging
100 ministerial discretion. When different political parties involved in coalition do not arrive at

101 unanimous decision, the coalition government fails. Thus it is relevant to study the different
102 challenges that coalition government faces due to ministerial discretion.


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110 **Fig. 1 Systematic review chart**

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112 **3. DISCUSSION**

113 **3.1 Coalition government basic structure and functioning regarding modelling coalition** 114 **policymaking**

115 A study conducted by W. Martin & Vanberg(2007)found out that political parties in coalition
116 governments have different perspective in terms of interests and culture. And this is the major
117 challenge faced by Government of policy making.

118 Another similar study conducted by Moore & Mukherjee(2006)argued that two factors guide
119 policymaking in coalition governments. One is the preferences of the parties involved which
120 is different from each other, and the other is the institutional limitations on the policy-making
121 by such multi-party governments which compels the coalition government to come to
122 unanimous decision. It was also found that the preferences of the parties is the cause of the
123 problems arising in delegation and the institutional limitations on the policy-making aligns
124 with solutions to the issues. From the perspective of theory, both the factors play a crucial
125 role in the successful execution of the agenda considering party as the principal and ministers
126 as agents or secondary to the process of decision making. Due to the working of the above
127 two factors policy disagreement arises among the political parties in Parliament. Policy
128 disagreements are an important consideration in politics of coalition governments. The
129 condition of policymaking in the coalition is governed by the preferences of the actors or the
130 agents involved. Also, the continuity of the governments in office is considerably influenced
131 by the internal setting of preferences of the agents. The actions that are taken in the
132 formulation of policy are highly influenced by the actions defined by each political agent in
133 the Parliament. The policy-making decisions regarding enactment and passing of legislation
134 are often hindered by disagreement flowing from the participant's preferences (Naoto, 2007).
135 When all the partners commit themselves to agree on specific issues, it makes the
136 implementation of the legislation easier and less of an obstacle race. The literature review
137 reveals that the consensus among parties leads to better legislation.

138 **3.2 The historical aspect of coalition governments**

139 Historically it has been seen that Indian National Congress has been the single largest party in
140 India since its inception in 1885. Even when India became independent in 1947, the Congress
141 party ruled over India without any opposing or competing party (Veena K, 2016). A coalition
142 government was experienced in India as early as 1937 when Congress and the Muslim
143 League formed a coalition government in Uttar Pradesh at the time of operation of the
144 government of India Act, 1935. However, in free India, a coalition government was first
145 formed in 1977 where Congress and Janta government united under the leadership of Morarji
146 Desai. The formula of uniting all the opposition parties into a single party so that non-
147 Congress votes do not get divided amongst the opposing parties was proposed by Dr Ram
148 Manohar Lohia (Bisla, 2016). The four-party Janta government was in power from 1977 to
149 1979 due to the power struggle within the parties which led to the resignation of Mr Desai as
150 well as the departure of the prominent group leaders like George Fernandes, H.N. Bahuguna,
151 Biju Patnaik and Mudhu Limaye(Fadia, 1980)

152 The second coalition government in India was formed in 1979 with Mr Charan Singh being
153 the prime minister who had the support of CPI (Communist Party of India) and CPI (M)
154 (Communist Party of India Marxist). However, he could not face the house due to his failure
155 to secure the vote of confidence in the house within three weeks' time (Thakurta & Shankar,
156 2004). The third coalition was formed in 1989 under the leadership of V.P. Singh which was
157 supported by the BJP, which was the second largest party in the country at that time. The
158 fourth coalition government was formed in 1990 under the leadership of Chandra Shekhar.
159 The fifth coalition was formed under the leadership of H.D. Deve Gowda under the banner of
160 united front government which was unison of 13 parties including Congress, CPI, Samajwadi
161 Party, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, and Asom Gana Parishad amongst others (F. A. Malik
162 & Malik, 2014).

163 The sixth coalition was formed in 1997 under the leadership of I.K. Gujral, and seventh was
164 formed in 1998 led by A.B. Vajpayee which was supported by AIADMK, BJD, Akali Dal,
165 Shiv Sena and others. The eighth coalition was formed in 1999 which was led by A.B.
166 Vajpayee under National Democratic Alliance (NDA) which was led by BJP (Bhartiye Janta
167 Party) and supported by 24 political parties including AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida
168 Munnetra Kazhagam), Telgu Dasam Party, NC, Trinamool Congress and others (R. P. S.
169 Malik, 2009). The ninth, as well as a tenth coalition, was formed in May 2004 and 2009
170 respectively under the leadership of Dr Manmohan Singh under the party named United
171 Progressive Alliance supported by Nationalist Congress Party, Rashtriya Lok Dal, and others

172 including left parties (Bisla, 2016). The eleventh coalition was formed in 2014 by the
173 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the BJP with Narendra Modi as the Prime
174 Minister.

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176 **3.3 Delegation and agency problems in coalition governments**

177 Delegation problem of responsibilities, finance, policy action and other actions in Parliament
178 give rises to Coalition among government(Naoto, 2007). The participating parties in the
179 coalition have their electorates, agenda, ideals and policy concerns for which they go through
180 the whole hog of elections competing with parties who might become their partners in the
181 times to come. Their record as a party in the government becomes more important than their
182 record as a government in general because it determines their electoral fate in the future. It
183 becomes the cause of problems in delegating important portfolios like finance (Oppermann,
184 Brummer, & Willigen, 2003). President R. Venkataraman was of the opinion that Chandra
185 Shekhar was able to handle parliament competently but was under constant strain from the
186 Congress party which led to his resignation. This shows that it was the real government and
187 Chandra Shekhar can be merely called a proxy. This problem is referred to as the agency
188 problem in government political parties. Another challenge identified under agent issue by
189 Kostova (2004) is differences in preferences which are the major cause of agency problems in
190 the coalition governments. When parties with a divergent view of the functioning and
191 condition of the world will join hands, there is bound to be areas where there will be the
192 substantial differences in opinions on policymaking. In the case of H.D. Deve Gowda, the
193 Congress revoked its support to him due to the rising discontent regarding communication
194 over the coalition which led to the loss of a vote of confidence to the united front
195 government. There can almost never be similarity of beliefs and opinions amongst a wide
196 number of people and parties. Therefore, it is a challenge for the leader of a coalition
197 government to make decisions and plan and execute various policies or obtain consensus
198 from all sides. However, this does not validate the withdrawing of support or compelling a
199 minister to resign due to the difference in opinions (Ricker, 1962). The amount and extent to
200 which policy decisions are influenced by diverse political views of equally diverse political
201 parties will determine the probable implementation of an electoral promise. Though it
202 becomes imperative to arrive at some common ground; it becomes necessary for parties to

203 compromise. Such compromise would depend on the issue under discussion and the
204 preference of the involved parties as to which policy is more important to them.

205 Hazlehurst (2001) on the same grounds found out that the participant parties not only have
206 different views on specific issues, they also have a different take on the level of importance
207 of various policies. In case of United Progressive Alliance (UPA 2) government, Trinamool
208 Congress (TMC) Chief Mamta Bannerjee withdrew her support from the UPA because their
209 demands of rolling back of reforms were not met. Their rollback of reforms included issues
210 like FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in retail, the rise in the price of diesel and limiting the
211 number of subsidized gas cylinders for households. Similarly, the DMK (Dravida Munnetra
212 Kazhagam) also withdrew its support due to an issue of a draft resolution at the United
213 Nations Human Rights Council regarding violation of human rights to Sri Lankan Tamils. It
214 shows that the difference of opinions amongst the different parties leads to withdrawal of
215 support from the coalition. Care needs to be taken to ensure that important policies are
216 handled properly despite the difference in opinions amongst the parties (Vaddiraju, 2017). A
217 logical inference garnered from the study is that a specific policy proposal to be implemented
218 is more likely to get support if it is relevant to individual specific parties as well as in the case
219 of UPA 2 government. Stressing certain policies will drive up the perceived competency or
220 credibility of certain parties while the position of other parties remains unaffected. It drives
221 the moves of various parties in the coalition.

222 Further, with the formation of the coalition government, the agreements and the distribution
223 of key areas and policy decisions are all settled through negotiation and mutual agreements.
224 There have been various instances in the Indian politics where the regional parties like
225 Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) have had to collaborate
226 with BJP to avoid bifurcation of their votes against their common enemy, i.e. Congress party.
227 Therefore, they were forced to support BJP to protect their electoral prospects (Hoerber &
228 Rudolph, 2002). A similar study conducted by Herd (2010) found out consensus to be the
229 factor responsible for the agreements among the Coalition Government. But each government
230 has to start with existing policies and regulations to the status quo. If the government desires
231 to alter these, they again will need a consensus. In the absence of the agreement, the status
232 quo remains. In coalition governments, each party tries to block policy changes which either
233 may be adversely affect its quo. Thus it can be stated that the power equation is more in
234 favour of the party seeking changes to current policy rather than changing the status quo.

235 **3.4 Challenging ministerial discretion**

236 In a study conducted by Wang, Nathwani, & Wu (2016), it was found that the functioning of
237 multi-party governments is severely hindered as participating parties use their control over
238 their ministries under their jurisdiction to address and advance their specific agenda rather
239 than cooperates in the coalition. In the case of Telangana movement cooperation the
240 announcement of the formation of a separate Telangana state led to protests across both
241 Andhra and Rayalaseema. It included the resignation of MLAs (Member of Legislative
242 Assembly) from those regions seeking reversal of the orders of the home minister. It took a
243 lot of committees and consensus to take a stand on this issue which shows that the parties use
244 their power to tilt the government policies in their favour (Bisla, 2016). Apart from the
245 divisiveness of the political parties, the preferences ostensibly converts into potential and
246 actual agency loss because of the need to delegate implementation of the policy from the
247 combined cabinet to the individual ministers or agents whose individual policy position may
248 differ substantially from the coalition average. A researcher in his study Hazlehurst held
249 *control mechanism* as one of the ways to keep coalition party confined to a specific course of
250 action. There is a control mechanism under work that parties of coalition use which is the
251 bargaining power to keep the coalition and the majority party on to a specific course of
252 action. If it does not work out, support is threatened to be withdrawn. It was found that such
253 challenges to coalition severely threaten the functioning of the government and even
254 constrain or slower down the public policy decisions making by hindering the progress. For
255 example, a few days before the RathYatra was about to end at Ayodhya in 1990, the then-
256 chief minister of Bihar, Lalu Prasad Yadav made L K Advani prisoned in Samastipur. BJP
257 had warned that it would withdraw support if Advani is arrested, so, on his arrest, BJP
258 withdrew support which left the country unstable. R.Venketaraman observed,

259 *“It is my impression that if V.P. Singh had headed a government with a clear*
260 *majority instead of depending on a conglomeration of parties mutually destructive to*
261 *each other, he would have given a good administration to the country. Being*
262 *dependent on parties with different objectives and ideologies, he could not withstand*
263 *pressures from discordant groups” (Venkataraman, 1994).*

264 This shows that there are other reasons, besides political, which lead to withdrawal of support
265 by political parties from a coalition government.

266 Apart from arriving at a policy bargain consensus, the parties involved in the coalition
 267 government have to strike a balance on the allocation of ministerial portfolios. Because
 268 jurisdiction over a certain portfolio allocates power over agenda setting, it can be regarded as
 269 a dominant instrument capable of influencing the enactment or prevention of a specific policy
 270 decision (Strøm & McClean, 2015). In 1997, Inder Kumar Gujral was selected as a consensus
 271 candidate amongst others including Lalu Prasad Yadav, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Indian
 272 National Congress, left parties and others. When Inder Kumar Gujral refused to dismiss any
 273 DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) leaders from his government, INC (Indian National
 274 Congress) withdrew support from the government which led to the resignation of Mr Gujral
 275 (Gupta, 1998). Despite this, there is not much freedom to appoint whomsoever to the cabinet
 276 as the party considers because it depends on the influence of the participating parties and the
 277 candidate's popularity with the public. Cabinet ministers tend to choose and implement their
 278 own party's policy ideals rather than the collective ideals in the areas under their
 279 jurisdictions. It can be started after doing the literature review that there lies an enormous
 280 potential for agency loss in the policy delegation from the coalition government as a whole to
 281 the ministers as individuals. It happens because the preferences of individuals and collectives
 282 are divergent (Xwkru, Hhwhu, & Zrun, 1999).

283 **Table 1: Table of factors responsible for Challenges**

S No.	Study details	Challenge	Factors responsible	Relationship
1	(Martin & Vanberg, 2014)	Policymaking in the coalition government	Preference of party involved	The institutional limitation is the solution to this challenge
2	(Meeting, 2001)	Policy disagreement in Coalition government	Preference of actor	The condition of policymaking in the coalition government is governed by this factor
3	(Naoto, 2007)	Delegation issue	Personal agendas	Cause of issue in delegating important portfolios

4	(Opperman et al., 2003)	Policy disagreement in Coalition government	Institutional limitation	Institutional limitation is solution to this challenge
5	(Strøm & McClean, 2015)	Delegation issue	Personal ideals	Cause of issue in delegating important portfolios
6	(Wang et al., 2016)	Policy disagreement in Coalition government	Agents involved	Governance of policy making
7	(Xwkru et al., 1999)	Delegation issue	Personal Policy concerns	Cause of issue in delegating important portfolios
8	(Kostova, 2004)	Agency problem	Difference in preference	Divergent preference leads to disagreement
9	(Gelder, 2017)	Policy decision	Negotiation	Negotiation helps in policy making
10	(Seyd, 2002)	Agency problem	Difference in preference	Divergent preference leads to disagreement

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286 **3.5 Possible existing and potential solutions to the identified challenges**

287 Given such delegation problems, Hazlehurst found out that the parties of the coalition may
288 resort to controlling mechanism that will seek to help keep the differences at bay and prevent

289 the ministers of different parties holding different portfolios from drifting away from the
290 popular mandate.

291 In another similar study conducted by Gelder (2017), it was found out that to *restrict future*
292 *policy actions* from sliding away from common coalition ground, a potential solution can be
293 to *assign junior ministers* from the majority party the job of being an overseer. As it was
294 noted that there are differences in the preferences of individual actors and collective, the
295 *allocation of portfolios* can be considered as a solution to ensure successful delegation and
296 execution of legislative agenda in policymaking. Ministers are then more likely to implement
297 and continue with tasks assigned to them as it aligns with their party's policies as opposed to
298 the coalition collective. A coalition is likely to be more successful if the parties moderate their
299 ideologies and programmes along with listening to the point of view of ministers of other
300 political parties as well. It is not necessary that all parties shall have similar beliefs and
301 ideologies which might lead to difficulty in achieving consensus on issues. A considerable
302 literature review has pointed towards using this as a strategic move. Additionally, this also
303 hinders the autonomy of the senior minister to some extent thus, effectively reducing the
304 ministerial discretion (Naoto, 2007).

305 In the real world democracies, the coalition practice doesnot give complete autonomy to the
306 individual heads or cabinet ministers. The individual heads have to work within the ambit of
307 rules imposed by the coalition, and this helps in overcome the problem of decision making
308 and delegation. Holding a particular portfolio gives power to the respective party to influence
309 decision making, but on the other hand, it also gives the power to other parties to challenge
310 the decision (Martin, 2015).

311 Another solution that can be considered is the formulation of a coalition agreement or a
312 contract. It can have a significant effect on the performance of cabinets in public
313 policymaking. Such drafts can reduce the negative impact of the differentiation in individual
314 preferences. It will also assist in limiting the ministerial discretion of cabinet ministers in
315 their respective ministries (Wang et al., 2016).

316 **Table 2: Table of identified solutions to a particular challenge**

S. No.	Studies Details	Issue	Factors resulting in the resolution of
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			the issue
1	(Hazlehurst, 2001)	Solution to delegation problem	Control mechanism
2	(Gelder, 2017)	Prevent future policy action from drifting	Assign Junior Ministers an overseer
3	(Naoto, 2007)	Successful execution of Parliament agenda	Allocation of portfolios
4	(Martin, 2015)	Reducing negative impact of the differentiation in parties preference	Formulation of a coalition contract or agreement
5	(Wang et al. (2016)	Divergent view	Bargaining power through control mechanism results in converging of views

317 **1.1.1 summary**

318 In the study conducted above, which entailed a systematic literature review, it was examined
319 that the delegation problem has a considerable impact in the real world policy-making
320 decisions in multi-party governments. Moreover, it was found that the Indian party system
321 has become fragmented since 1996. Due to the decline of the Congress party and the
322 simultaneous rise of the BJP accompanied with the rise of a large number of other state-based
323 parties with few seats which lead to the necessity of formation of coalition governments party
324 ideology and functioning criteria. It was found to be a major influencer followed by
325 preferences of individual actors in impacting policymaking agenda. Allocation of portfolios
326 among the different political parties in Parliament can significantly help in the achievement
327 of Parliament agendas. The absence of converging preferences of the participating parties of
328 the coalition government, division of portfolios among cabinet ministers leading to a power
329 struggle, and ministerial discretions all enhance the potential for agency loss in the delegation
330 in parliamentary activity.

331 On similar grounds, the U.K.'s coalition has proved to be a setback example. During the First
332 World War. An all-party coalition was formed under the first Prime Minister Herbert Asquith
333 which replaced the last Liberal government. This coalition marked its ending in 1922 with
334 decision of conservatives to leave the group. Another coalition came into power in 1931 under
335 PM David Cameron which faced heavy economic losses. It was the Great Depression, and
336 Britain's Labour government failed in dealing with it. Even after this, voters supported
337 coalition government during the general elections. Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain
338 were two conservatives that acted as prime ministers heading the National Government,
339 which ended in 1940. This was then replaced with another coalition under Winston Churchill.
340 In 1974, Britain engaged in minority government. Labour's Harold Wilson won the elections
341 and ended up forming Parliament. Though Liberals tried to form coalition but failed at the
342 end and Wilson headed a minority government (Daniel Schwartz, 2010).

343 The possible solutions have been identified in the systematic review for example, the country
344 with divergent and coalition government is recommended to formulate an agreement in the
345 starting itself to reduce the future impact of divergent preference of political parties in policy
346 formulation. The main reason behind the success of coalition government in an economy
347 where the parties withdraw support for the smallest reasons is that there are no friends or
348 enemies in politics; the only thing permanent is interest. Along with it, the presence of
349 ideological differences on important issues like liberalisation, secularism, expectations of
350 instability leads to the rise of minority coalitions which lead to difficulties in planning and
351 implementation of policies.

352 **1.2 Conclusion**

353 The coalition government is a multi-party government where several party cooperate and
354 govern as a single government. The aim of the present research was to study the challenges
355 and the solutions of the policy making in coalition government. On the basis of the systematic
356 review, the researcher identified 3 major challenges that are faced by coalition government.
357 These are modelling of coalition government, delegating and agency issues and challenges of
358 ministerial discretion. It has been observed that coalition government has more or less failed
359 to serve the purpose of governing the country. For instance, as discussed in the above
360 section, U.K's coalition government was one of the setback example that failed to continue
361 forming coalition government and ended up as minority government. Modelling of the
362 coalition government has represented the complex structure of the coalition government. This
363 complex structure involves several parties belonging to different background and culture
364 coming into contact to form coalition government. Another identified challenge is delegation

365 and agency issue where delegation of power, authority and responsibilities among different
366 parties forming coalition government was an issue. Finally, ministerial discretion where the
367 parties wanted to exercise the power of their ministries under their jurisdiction.

368 As per the literature review, it can be recommended to Coalition government to adhere to the
369 control mechanism to prevent delegation problem within the working of Parliament.
370 Bargaining power through control mechanism results in converging of views. Another
371 identified solution is assigning junior ministries an overseer will help in effective
372 policymaking because the juniors can then focus on their individual assigned tasks

373 The results of this study can be generalised on other democracies to the extent to which the
374 political systems are similar. If the coalition governments share characteristics, the results can
375 be applied, but a comparative research design needs to conduct to arrive at more specific
376 conclusions.

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